We revisit the relationship between informal institutions and income levels. The empirical literature on institutions finds that indices of "informal institutions" such as trust, respect, respect, self-determination, and obedience are more important than "formal institutions" such as constitutional constraints in explaining income levels across countries. We add to this literature in two ways. First, we separate out the index of informal institutions into its component parts to see which informal institutions are primary. Second, we construct two new measures of obedience to test the robustness of obedience. Our reduced-form results indicate the primacy of obedience over other informal institutions.
Introduction
In the last two decades a large literature has developed that focuses on the role institutions play in fostering economic development. This scholarship finds that institutions are responsible for the divergence in prosperity across countries (Dawson 1998; Acemoglu 2002; Glaeser et al. 2004 ). Uncertainty still exists, however, regarding the relative importance of different types of institutions and their relationships with growth. More recent research examines the relative effects of informal versus formal institutions on prosperity to try to establish whether informal institutions such as trust, respect, self-determination, and obedience are more important for economic development than formal institutions like constitutional constraints. (Tabellini 2010;
Williamson 2010).
The origins of the cross-country empirical literature on informal institutions goes back to the work of Knack and Keefer's (1997) important work on trust and economic performance using data from the World Values Survey (2009). In an influential paper, Tabellini (2010) builds on Knack and Keefer's work by introducing three new aspects of informal institutions: respect, self-determination, and obedience. Like Knack and Keefer, Tabellini finds that elements of social capital such as self-determination, trust, and respect are favorable to economic development but that obedience is negatively related. In addition, he presents some preliminary evidence that informal institutions might be at least as important as formal institutions as a determinant of economic performance. In an extension of Tabellini's work, Williamson (2010) combines the informal measures of institutions used by Tabellini into an index of informal institutions. She does the same thing with the formal measures of institutions used by Glaeser et al (2004) . Looking at per capita GDP levels in 2000, she finds formal institutions to be negatively related to development differences across countries and informal institutions to be positively related. For more on the reasons why informal institutions might be more important than formal ones, we refer the reader to Williamson (2008) .
In this paper we build off of Williamson's (2010) informal institutions -in particular obedience -in order to better understand the role of obedience in economic development and to spur additional data collection and research.
The paper progresses as follows. Section 2 describes our data, while Section 3 discusses our empirical approach and results. Section 4 concludes.
Data and Empirical Approach
Our primary interest in this paper is further examining the role that informal institutions play in in per capita GDP levels. For that reason we begin with the basic data of Tabellini (2010) In the literature, obedience is typically thought to be negatively related to growth because obedience to cultural norms can be unconditional and stifling of individual initiative and group cooperation (Tabellini 2010). While it is true that an individual abiding by social rules constrains their opportunities, the impact of obedience on growth and development reflects the level of other institutions within society. In societies with high levels of obedience to authority or other norms, citizens are aware of how other members will usually act in market transactions. When dealing in infrequent transactions that are not repeated, exchange with an obedient partner will increase predictability, reduce transaction costs, and thereby promote efficiency. From this perspective, higher levels of obedience promote market exchange and thus might promote higher levels of GDP.
Our first measure of obedience we call "Obedience -Child Quality." This is the measure of obedience used by Tabellini (2010) Others say that one should follow one's superior's instructions only when one is convinced that they are right. With which of these two opinions do you agree?" Respondents are given a score of one if they indicate willingness to follow instructions without any questions and a score of zero if the individual must be convinced first. An appealing feature of this measure of obedience is that by asking about job duties, it is most separate from other contemporary formal and informal institutions.
Our third measure of obedience -"Obedience -Authority Respect" -asks respondents about their feelings towards greater respect for authority in the future. Respondents indicating they feel this is a "good thing" are given a score of one whereas respondents indicating this is a "bad thing" are given a score of zero. This question may be flawed because it may be related to current sentiment towards government within that country. If that is the case obedience would be contaminated by the current social environment.
In addition to these measures of formal institutions, our analysis looks to important Our regression results on a cross-section of countries are presented below in Table 2 . To correct for heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Variance inflation factors for all regressions specified in Table 2 The first important thing to note in our results is that all three measures of obedience are positively related to per capita GDP levels in 2000 in a statistically significant manner. Most surprising is the result using the measure of obedience we call "Obedience -Child Quality."
Recall that this is based on the same question as used by Tabellini (2010) These findings provide some evidence of the relative importance that obedience might play in enhancing market efficiency. At a minimum, however, these findings suggest that most measures of formal and informal institutions might not be as important as once thought in determining current income levels. Certainly, further research is warranted.
Conclusion
Our results show that when disaggregated the effect of informal institutions on economic performance might be different than what has been previously presented in the literature. Our results, which incorporate new measures of obedience and explicitly include other important formal and informal institutions simultaneously, suggest that obedience has relative primacy over other measures of informal institutions such as trust, respect, and self-determination.
Our results provide some suggestive evidence that efficiency implications attributed to trust, respect, and self-determination are not to be found when other formal and informal institutions are taken into account. This finding, however, may be a feature of the limited data available and by no means is conclusive evidence that trust, respect, and self-determination do not have a significant relationship with GDP per capita. Due to the evidence presented within this paper, future research should look into the different relationships present between varied measures of obedience, other formal and informal institutions, and GDP per capita. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
